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We focus on social touch as a paradigmatic case of a unifying perspective on the embodied, 
cognitive and metacognitive processes involved in social, affective regulation. Social touch 
appears to have three interrelated but distinct functions in affective regulation. First, it regulates 
affects by fulfilling embodied expectations about social proximity and attachment, mostly 
likely by convergent hedonic, dopaminergic and analgesic, opioidergic pathways. Second, 
caregiving touch such as feeding or warming an infant regulates affect by socially enacting 
homeostatic control and co-regulation of physiological states, most likely by corresponding 
‘calming’ autonomic and endocrine pathways. Third, affective touch such as gentle stroking, 
kissing or tickling regulates affect by allostatic regulation of the salience and epistemic gain of 
particular experiences in given contexts and timescales, possibly regulated by oxytocin release 




Introduction: Self Versus Social Affective Regulation 
 
Affective regulation refers to the monitoring and modulation of the intensity, duration 
or nature of an affective state in pursuit of homeostasis (e.g., [1]). Affective states are typically 
valenced (positive or negative) feelings of variable arousal with corresponding behavioural 
tendencies of approach or avoidance. Some authors distinguish between affect and emotion 
regulation. Here we use the term affect regulation more generally to describe the regulation of 
any affective state, whether or not it is occurring within a more specific emotional experience. 
For example, anger, fear, anxiety and pain can all be said to be accompanied by negative affect 
that one may be motivated to reduce.  
 
Affective regulation has been described primarily in intrapersonal terms as the ability 
to exercise cognitive control over one’s affective states (self-regulation; [2]), either before (e.g., 
avoiding a stressful situation) or after affect is experienced (e.g., suppressing one’s outward 
expression of inner feelings; [1]). The majority of this work has focused on higher-order 
cognitive abilities and their neural correlates, such as the role of prefrontal systems in 
modulating the activity of subcortical systems [3] and related neuroendocrinological pathways, 
including the downregulation of the hypothalamus–pituitary–adrenocortical (HPA) system 
during stressful situations [4]. However, there are also parallel traditions in animal research, 
psychology, and more recently social cognitive neuroscience, that have understood the role of 
interpersonal and social mechanisms in affect regulation [5-7]. Importantly, these literatures 
have understood that affect can be modulated by both cognitive and embodied processes, such 
as social touch [8]; [9]*;[10]. 
 
Yet, an integrative theoretical framework for understanding both embodied and 
cognitive effects of social regulation is still missing [11, 12]. Characteristically, one of the most 
influential recent theories of social emotion regulation, Social Baseline Theory, states that the 
brain’s default expectation is the availability of social resources and thus the resource-
demanding task of regulation can be outsourced to others [13]. While we agree with this 
perspective [14], we argue that the social regulation of affect entails more embodied and 
cognitive effects than mere signaling of social protection*.  
 
Specifically, we focus on social touch as a paradigmatic case of socioaffective 
regulation, and put forward a model of the regulatory mechanisms involved, ranging from 
embodied modulation to metacognitive monitoring. This model is embedded in wider 
perspectives on the central role of homeostasis, rather than rationality in cognition, and 
particularly the theoretical framework ‘Mentalising Homeostasis’ that we have proposed to 
characterise the interdependence between interoception, cognition and socialisation [12, 14-
17]*. According to this widely discussed framework (see commentaries on [12]; [18, 19]*), 
affect is not the result of ascending “sensory” signals and descending “modulatory” cognitive 
influences, but rather the result of a single hierarchical system of recurring processes including 
predictive, feedforward and feedback loops (e.g. [20]), as understood particularly in 
hierarchical Bayesian brain accounts [21]. We review recent literature from the perspective of 
this framework to offer a unifying perspective on the embodied, cognitive and metacognitive 
processes by which tactile, social interactions regulate affect.  
 
Contact Comfort: Social Proximity and Attachment as a First Prior 
 
We propose that maternal contact and early touch with caregivers in infancy constitute 
a first prior [17], or an evolutionary prescribed expectation for contact comfort [22] and social 
attachment [23]. This prior is fulfilled in early development with corresponding physiological 
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mechanisms for seeking and enjoying (dopaminergic and opioidergic pathways, respectively 
[24]) skin-to-skin contact and social proximity, and avoiding social isolation. These 
mechanisms are assumed to have affective correlates, so that social contact is accompanied by 
positive, hedonic affect and corresponding approach tendencies, while social isolation is 
experienced as distressing and leads to corresponding avoidance tendencies. Indeed, variation 
in postnatal (skin-to-skin) touch regulate several physiological dimensions, including fear, 
noxious and stress reactivity [25]*; [26]*; [11], including physiological, epigenetic and 
neuroendocrine processes involved in the development of adaptive HPA reactivity [27]. The 
primary, ‘baseline’ [13] function of such ‘contact comfort’ mechanisms is typically understood 
as the increase of the infant’s engagement with the caregiver, ultimately promoting social 
attachment as a safe base for cognitive, affective and physical development [28]* and a life-
long need for social affiliation. 
 
However, as social and embodied regulation are highly integrated from the outset, we 
propose that the role of touch in development and cognition is not limited to this primary 
attachment function, but rather it extends to at least two further functions, namely homeostatic 
regulation [12] and allostatic regulation ([6]; [18]; see Figure 1 for definitions). These functions 
are, of course, tightly interlinked but for clarity we outline them here in turn. 
 
Caregiving Touch as Homeostatic Affect Regulation 
 
First, at a homeostatic level,  touch involved in everyday caregiving, typically 
considered as merely ‘instrumental’, can play a unique role in interoceptive inference and what 
we have called  the ‘embodied mentalisation’ of interoception [12]. When a parent feeds, or 
holds an infant, they are not just maintaining attachment and informing us about our social 
mileau; they are also simultaneously actively modulating the infant’s physiological states, their 
internal mileau and hence her affect. Given the prolonged motor immaturity of human infants, 
proximal engagement with caregivers is necessary for infants to regulate homeostasis and 
eventually build generative models regarding their bodily needs (e.g., plan the actions that 
would lead to satiation when hungry). Otherwise, the unaided infant cannot fulfil its 
interoceptive predictions. Thus, most interoceptive regulation in infancy is performed via 
caregiving touch (see Figure 1). For instance, human newborns are unable to maintain their 
body temperature without thermal protection. Signals from thermoreceptors reach the 
hypothalamus, leading to norepinephrine release that then triggers nonshivering thermogenesis, 
or lipolysis of brown adipose tissue [29]. This main homeothermic heat production mechanism 
is insufficient in newborns because it depends on the levels of available adiposity and certain 
enzymes that only build up later in development. Instead, a more effective mechanism is infant 
affective behavior, e.g. prompting caregiving by crying. It follows that the rate by which bodily 
interactions between caregivers and infants fulfil interoceptive predictions is accompanied by 
arousal reduction, motor relaxation [30], and affect modulation (prediction error rate reduction 
leading to positive affect and vice versa; [31]). Thus, caregiving touch leads to arousal and 
valence fluctuations regarding homeostatic needs, and can regulate affect by the corresponding 
autonomic and endocrine pathways, in addition to the aforementioned hedonic, calming and 
analgesic benefits of the touch itself.   
 
More generally, during these proximal interactions in early infancy, caregivers offer 
multimodal “matching” between their bodies and those of their infants [32]. Studies in 
cardiorespiratory synchronization, for example, show that touch can entail an embodied 
transfer of the carer’s own parasympathetic regulation to the infant [33]. Moreover, a 
mother’s hug that has somatosensory, cardiorespiratory and thermoregulation consequences is 
accompanied also by her smell, her song and her face [34]*. Multisensory input about the 
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maternal body is thus bound together in common inferences about the causes of changes to 
one’s physiological states (embodied mentalisation; [12]), with this binding possibly being 
processed by subcortical limbic areas even before episodic memories can be laid down [35]. 
In everyday life, feeding, sleeping, bathing routines typically include endless repetitions of 
multisensory and affect-modulating bundles from at least two bodies. Thus, touch is a central 
building block of the mentalization of the internal mileau of the body, that is, the progressive 
build-up of multisensory, autonomic and motor predictions about the variable physiological 
states of the body and its couplings with the outside world. In adulthood, interpersonal and 
group synchrony continues to have regulatory effects, supporting empathy, collaboration and 
joint action (e.g., [36]). 
 
Affective Touch as Allostatic Affect Regulation 
 
The second way in which social touch contributes to affect regulation relates to 
allostasis. Allostasis refers to achieving physiological stability through preemptive change 
across different temporal scales, for example adjusting one’s metabolic needs in certain 
environments where foraging is dangerous ([37]; see Figure 1). According to certain theories 
of allostasis [38], allostatic regulation relies on learned, hierarchically organized, generative 
models of how interoceptive-exteroceptive couplings are likely to change over time. More 
specifically, while homeostatic control enslaves reflexes to produce actions (effectors in Figure 
1) that correct prediction errors and fulfill beliefs about bodily states, allostasis requires a 
temporary change or suspension of interoceptive set points, effectively altering the priors 
(beliefs) of the relevant homeostatic reflex arc under the guidance of higher predictive models 









Figure 1. A schematic representation of our model sinthesizing the role of touch in social 
homeostasis and allostasis in development. (A) Although the exact relation between the 
terms homeostasis and allostasis remains debated, we follow certain active inference 
theories in regarding allostasis as an extention of direct homeostatic control to flexible, 
indirect control via ‘counterfactual’ predictions about future interoceptive states [39]. Left 
panel: Using afferent information to sense homeostatic deviation, processes are used to 
match fixed homeostatic setpoints by correcting (i.e., counter-regulating) any detected 
errors. Right panel: By predicting what level will be needed to change or delay a variable 
set-point (according to contextual demands and long-term goals), processes are used to 
override local prediction errors, in the service of anticipated prediction errors higher in the 
hierarchy. (B) Left panel: Caregiving touch serves to match fixed homeostatic setpoints by 
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correcting, (i.e., counter-regulating) any detected errors. Such interactions are needed 
given that the unaided infant cannot act to correct (counter-regulate) interoceptive error 
signals and hence close the interoceptive action-perception loop by herself. Right panel: 
Affective touch in the dyad is used to change or delay a variable set-point according to 
contextual demands and long-term goals. By doing this, the parent helps the infant tolerate 
local prediction errors in the service of anticipated prediction errors higher in the 
hierarchy.  
 
We propose that certain types of social touch, such as stroking or tickling, that have a 
communicative role in early social interactions [8] and thoughout the life-span [40] are 
implicated in allostatic control (Figure 1). Specifically, the role of affective, communicative 
touch is not only to match some fixed homeostatic set-point as in the case of caregiving touch, 
but frequently this touch can be used to delay or change a variable set-point according to 
contextual demands and long-term goals (Figure 1). While, as aforementioned, attachment-
promoting and caregiving touch aimed to satisfy the infant’s social and bodily needs in a 
contingent, synchronous way [32], affective touch appears to promote a rebalancing between 
homeostatic and allostatic needs in a given bodily and social context. For example, a father may 
tickle an infant to keep it awake a bit longer to better regulate its sleeping-eating cycle around 
the mother’s availability. Indeed, there is evidence that stroking an infant can act as an 
embodied, ostensive cue directing attention towards expectedepistemic gains, such as learning 
the identity of faces [41]*. In adults, socioaffective touch can modulate the salience of noxious 
stimulation in given contexts and related responses in anterior insular and cingulate cortices 
[15, 16]. Thus, socioaffective touch may be a way by which humans not only outsource 
homeostatic regulation to caregivers, but also outsource the processing of salience and 
epistemic gain to their social environment, so as best to learn to eventually serve their own 
allostasis in a given social and physical niche [42]*; [43].  
 
The neurobiology of allostasis cannot be fully covered here, but existing theories (e.g., 
[38]) converge on the role of anterior insular and cingulate cortex (AIC and ACC), subgenual 
and orbitofrontal cortex (SGC and OFC), as comprising the deepest level of a wider circuit for 
allostasis (see Figure 2). These areas have access to prediction errors about interoception 
arriving in granular layer IV of the primary interoceptive insular cortex, and the connectivity 
that allows them to modulate homeostatic beliefs in a collection of subcortical regions, 
including the central nucleus of the amygdala, the ventral and dorsal striatum, fulfilled by reflex 
arcs in regions like the hypothalamus or brain stem [38]. Importantly, such top-down 
predictions do not only represent the content of lower-level representations but also predict their 
uncertainty in given contexts, defined in the above models as the precision of a probability 
distribution (inverse variance or uncertainty). This kind of top-down prediction in sensory 
cortices is thought to be mediated by neuromodulatory mechanisms that optimise the attentional 
gain of populations encoding prediction errors, such as cholinergic and dopaminergic 
modulations in fronto-striatal circuits [44] and by neuropeptides such as oxytocin in social 
contexts [45]. In interoception, precision may relate to interoceptive sensitivity [46] and may 
be modulated by contextual factors at different allostatic scales. Of relevance, the 
aforementioned central hubs of allostatic control, namely AIC and ACC, in connection with 
temporoparietal junction regions, form part of the salience network, with a recognised role in 
modulating the salience of prediction errors during interoception, multisensory integration and 
body awareness [47]. 
  
In addition, these areas, together with OFC, SGC and amygdala are considered the key 
target areas of central oxytogenergic modulations, as well as central hubs of brain circuits 
supporting affective touch, and particularly stroking touch [48], activating a population of 
 
7 
unmyelinated C-tactile (CT) afferents [50]. This system, associated with oxytocin release in 
both animals (e.g., [49]*) and humans (e.g., [50]), is thought to play a fundamental but 
underspecified social role. Somewhat similarly, the social role of oxytocin is increasingly 
understood in allostatic terms [51]*. Indeed, oxytocin may exert effects on interoception by 
modulating the salience of sensory stimuli in relation to the social context in which they occur 
[15]. Thus, affective touch, via its relation to oxytocin and other neuromodulators, can act as a 
key precision modulator (e.g., [15, 16, 45]) during social allostasis, modulating key homeostatic 
setpoints according to long-term needs.  
 
Finally, we follow recent models of interoceptive inference [52]*; [38] to speculate that 
the role of affective touch in allostatic regulation has implications for metacognition. 
Specifically, the degree to which the developmental history of affective touch provision affects 
the development of allostatic regulation, it will form part of particular metacognitive styles 
about affect regulation (e.g., interoceptive confidence-accuracy relations, self-efficacy beliefs, 
expectations about the trustworthiness of others during threat, or attachment styles; Figure 2; 
[12, 38]; [43]). For example, attachment styles have also been found to relate not only to the 
perception of affective touch [53], but also to the degree to which pain is modulated by affective 
touch [54]. Further, the degree to which intranasal oxytocin downregulates HPA reactivity is 
related to individual differenes in affective regulation, with the authors proposing that 
appropriate, oxytogenergic parental care in childhood, like affective touch interactions, may 
have optimised the use of oxytocin for dealing with stressors in adulthood with the appropriate 
metacognitive strategies [55]. More generally, metacognitive traits about the controllability of 
sensory states as well as established attachment schemas have been linked with different 
neuroendocrinological and neural responses to stress [55]. This proposal is also based on 
numerous reports on how the precision of interoceptive states can directly influence 
exteroceptive uncertainty (e.g., [56]), but the specific development and life-long relationship 





Figure 2. A proposed circuit for interoception, allostatic and metacognitive regulation of 
homeostatic reflex arcs, and the role of caregiving and affective touch. Bluelines: sensory 
inputs; redlines: predictions ; greenlines: prediction errors (PE). In this model, we expand 
on the allostatic regulation model previously proposed by [38] by introducing novel aspects 
such as homeostatic and allostatic caregiving. Here, regions such as the anterior insula 
(AI), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and subgenual cortex 
(SGC), are at the top of this circuit (i.e., generating allostatic predictions, as they embody 
a generative model of inputs in order to infer current bodily states but also predict future 
states). These areas have access to prediction errors about interoception arriving from the 
posterior and mid-insula, as well as connectivity that conveys allostatic predictions and 
allows them to modulate homeostatic beliefs in a collection of subcortical regions, including 
the central nucleus of the amygdala, the ventral and dorsal striatum, fulfilled by reflex arcs 
in regions like the hypothalamus or brain stem. Critically, descending projections from the 
AI, ACC, OFC and SGC could send the same prediction to posterior and mid-insula serving 
as a corollary discharge against which sensory inputs can be compared, with the resulting 
PEs returned to the AI, ACC, OFC and SGC for allostatic adjustments. PEs from these brain 
areas can also project to frontoparietal networks, which in turn send descending self-
efficacy predictions and ultimately influence allostatic predictions.With respect to 
homeostatic caregiving (shaded in blue), we propose that the main areas correspond to the 
posterior and mid-insula, limbic system, and salience networks (primarily the AI and ACC, 
in connection with the tempoparietal junction), with its regulation implicating endogenous 
opioids and dopamine. In contrast, for allostatic caregiving (shaded in pink) we propose 
that the main areas are the AI, ACC, OFC and SGC (deepest level of a wider circuit for 
allostasis), with this kind of top-down prediction mediated by neuromodulatory mechanisms 
(e.g., cholinergic and dopaminergic in fronto-striatal circuits) and neuropeptides (e.g., 
oxytocin for social contexts). We further propose that allostatic caregiving engages both 
limbic and salience networks, with their connections to frontoparietal networks serving 
‘metacognition’ or precision optimisation purposes.  
 
Conclusion 
Typically, affect regulation is studied within two different traditions: self-regulation as 
a form of cognitive control and social regulation as a form of social support. In this paper, we 
have used social touch as a paradigmatic case of social, affective regulation of both positive 
and negative affect, and have argued that the role of touch in development and cognition, and 
particularly affect regulation, is not limited to attachment. Instead, social touch seems to 
contribute to affective regulation with functions that range from direct, physiological co-
regulation to the development of allostatic, cognitive and metacognitive models of regulation 
and social cognition. Specifically, social touch informs us about our social milieu, as it 
simultaneously regulates our internal mileau, and more broadly our homeostasis. Caregiving 
touch, in particular, plays a unique role in adaptive interoceptive inference, that is, the 
progressive build-up of multisensory, autonomic and motor predictions about the variable 
physiological states of the body and its couplings with the outside world. Finally, affective 
touch contributes to social allostasis, or predictive homeostasis. Thus, humans seem to 
outsource both the early attachment and homeostatic needs to caregivers and the processing of 
salience and epistemic gain, so as to best learn to eventually serve their own allostasis in a given 
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